Taking bail-in seriously - the looming risks for banking policy in the rescue of Monte Paschi di Siena
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
SAFE policy letter series ; 54
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt am Main
- (wer)
-
Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
- (wann)
-
2017
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-440017
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
14.08.2025, 11:03 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Beteiligte
- Götz, Martin
- Krahnen, Jan Pieter
- Tröger, Tobias
- Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Entstanden
- 2017
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