Politicians' Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition

Arbeitspapier

We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care about (what they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rents from being in office. We show that politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave opportunistically. A political culture may therefore be self-reinforcing and multiple equilibria may arise. We also show that politicians’ incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians’ pay and with polarization of policy preferences.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 04-065/1

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
• Subject: politicians' motivation ; politicians' pay ; political culture ; electoral competition ; coalition governments ; reputation bashing ; Politiker ; Motivation ; Neue politische Ökonomie ; Theorie ; Politische Kultur ; Wahlkampf

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Beniers, Klaas J. ; Dur, Robert
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86252
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET