Arbeitspapier

Works Councils and Separations: Voice, Monopoly, and Insurance Effects

Using a large linked employer-employee data set for Germany, we find that the existence of a works council is associated with a lower separation rate to employment, in particular for men and workers with low tenure. While works council monopoly effects show up in all specifications, clear voice effects are only visible for low tenured workers. Works councils also reduce separations to non-employment, and this impact is more pronounced for men. Insurance effects only show up for workers with tenure of more than one year. Our results indicate that works councils primarily represent the interests of a specific clientele.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: BGPE Discussion Paper ; No. 75

Classification
Wirtschaft
Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
Labor Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
Subject
works council
separations
collective voice
duration models
Germany
Betriebsrat
Kündigungsschutz
Beschäftigungseffekt
Deutschland

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hirsch, Boris
Schank, Thorsten
Schnabel, Claus
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE)
(where)
Nürnberg
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
20.09.2024, 8:21 AM CEST

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Hirsch, Boris
  • Schank, Thorsten
  • Schnabel, Claus
  • Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE)

Time of origin

  • 2009

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