- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Identifier
-
1063923492
- Reihe
-
Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series; No. 2005,07
- Thema
-
Langzeitvertrag; Risikomanagement; Haftungsbeschränkung; Wettbewerb
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
- URN
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
26.01.2023, 13:54 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Monografie
Beteiligte
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