Arbeitspapier

Aid, Conditionality, and War Economies

When natural resource revenues provide an important motive and/or means for armed conflict, the transition from war peace faces three challenges: (i) ensuring that the benefits and costs of natural resource exploitation are distributed so as to ease rather than exacerbate social tensions; (ii) channeling revenues to peaceful and productive purposes; and (iii) promoting accountability and transparency in natural resource management. Aid conditionality can help to address these challenges provided that three prerequisites are met: (i) there are domestic parties with sufficient authority and legitimacy to strike and implement aid-for-peace bargains; (ii) donor governments and agencies make peace their top priority, putting this ahead of other geopolitical, commercial, and institutional goals; and (iii) the aid 'carrot' is substantial enough to provide an incentive for pro-peace policies. Case studies of Cambodia, Angola, and Afghanistan illustrate both the scope and limitations of peace conditionality in such settings.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2004-05

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
war
natural resources
foreign aid
conditionality

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Boyce, James K.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics
(where)
Amherst, MA
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Boyce, James K.
  • University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2004

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