Good news and bad news in subjective performance evaluation

Arbeitspapier

Earlier studies show that contracts under subjective performance evaluation are dichotomous and punish only worst performance. I show that with limited liability payments need not be binary. More importantly, if the agent earns a rent from limited liability, the optimal contract distinguishes only signals of good news and bad news of the agent's action.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 444

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects ; Personnel Economics: Labor Management
• Thema: bonus ; monotone likelihood ratio ; wage compression

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Budde, Jörg
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17411
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94158
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17411-3
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ