Defectors’ intolerance of others promotes cooperation in the repeated public goods game with opting out
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
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2045-2322
- Extent
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Online-Ressource
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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online resource.
- Bibliographic citation
-
Defectors’ intolerance of others promotes cooperation in the repeated public goods game with opting out ; volume:10 ; number:1 ; day:11 ; month:11 ; year:2020 ; pages:1-12 ; date:12.2020
Scientific reports ; 10, Heft 1 (11.11.2020), 1-12, 12.2020
- Creator
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Křivan, Vlastimil
Cressman, Ross
- Contributor
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SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
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10.1038/s41598-020-76506-3
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2020121818104107444952
- Rights
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
- 15.08.2025, 7:36 AM CEST
Data provider
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Křivan, Vlastimil
- Cressman, Ross
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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