On the Difficulty of Budget Allocation in Claims Problems with Indivisible Items and Prices
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
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1572-9907
- Extent
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Online-Ressource
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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online resource.
- Bibliographic citation
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On the Difficulty of Budget Allocation in Claims Problems with Indivisible Items and Prices ; volume:30 ; number:5 ; day:29 ; month:6 ; year:2021 ; pages:1133-1159 ; date:10.2021
Group decision and negotiation ; 30, Heft 5 (29.6.2021), 1133-1159, 10.2021
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Creator
- Contributor
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SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
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10.1007/s10726-021-09750-1
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2021122621054519208435
- Rights
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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15.08.2025, 7:20 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Estañ, Teresa
- Llorca, Natividad
- Martínez, Ricardo
- Sanchez-Soriano, Joaquin
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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