Arbeitspapier

How Payment Systems Affect Physicians' Provision Behaviour – An Experimental Investigation

Understanding how physicians respond to incentives from payment schemes is a central concern in health economics research. We introduce a controlled laboratory experiment to analyse the influence of incentives from fee-for-service and capitation payments on physicians’ supply of medical services. In our experiment, physicians choose quantities of medical services for patients with different states of health. We find that physicians provide significantly more services under fee-for-service than under capitation. Patients are overserved under fee-forservice and underserved under capitation. However, payment incentives are not the only motivation for physicians’ quantity choices, as patients’ health benefits are of considerable importance as well. We find that patients in need of a high (low) level of medical services receive a larger health benefit under fee-for-service (capitation).

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 03/2011

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Thema
Physician payment system
laboratory experiment
incentives
fee-for-service
capitation
Ärzte
Arzthonorar
Vergütungssystem
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Gesundheitsversorgung
Test
Gesundheitsfinanzierung
Deutschland

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
Selten, Reinhard
Wiesen, Daniel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
  • Selten, Reinhard
  • Wiesen, Daniel
  • University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Entstanden

  • 2011

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