Arbeitspapier
Outside investor access to top management: Market monitoring versus stock price manipulation
This paper studies the role of voluntary disclosure in crowding out independent research about firm value. In the model, when inside firm owners make it easier for outside investors to obtain inexpensive biased information from the manager, investors rely less on costly unbiased research. As a result, managers are tempted to manipulate the firm stock price more, but investors are better informed because they anticipate manager manipulation. An increase in stock-price informativeness, therefore, has to be traded off against an increase inresources wasted on manipulation. I find that, surprisingly, firm owners grant investors more access to managers that manipulate more strongly. An implication is that the firm cost of capital is negatively related to manager manipulation.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2020-43
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
Accounting
- Thema
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Economic models
Financial markets
Recent economic and financial developments
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Schroth, Josef
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Bank of Canada
- (wo)
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Ottawa
- (wann)
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2020
- DOI
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doi:10.34989/swp-2020-43
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schroth, Josef
- Bank of Canada
Entstanden
- 2020