Going ballistic: The dynamics of the imagination and the issue of intentionalism

Abstract: Do we have control over the content of our imaginings? More precisely: do we have control over what our imaginings are about? Intentionalists say yes. Until recently, intentionalism could be taken as the received view. Recently, authors like Munro & Strohminger (2021) have developed some arguments against it. Here, I tentatively join their ranks and develop a new way to think about the way in which imaginings develop their contents that also goes against intentionalism. My proposal makes use of what we may call a ballistic framework for mental dynamics, which I sketch to some length. In this model, imaginings are articulated by ballistic events sensitive to constraints that modify the trajectories that imaginings trace in a special working space. This framework leaves room for alternatives to pre-assigned-content models, such as Kung’s (2016). In the ballistic-based models sketched here, and against intentionalism, imaginings can fail to be about what we intend them to be about. Th.... https://philosophymindscience.org/index.php/phimisci/article/view/10257

Angaben zum Objekt

• Standort: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Umfang: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Going ballistic: The dynamics of the imagination and the issue of intentionalism ; volume:5 ; year:2024 ; Philosophy and the mind sciences ; 5 (2024)

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Urheber: Morales Carbonell, Felipe

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2024.10257
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2024020717542245046067
• Rechteinformation: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 15.08.2025, 07:23 MESZ