Decidability in complex social choices

Arbeitspapier

Recently, Marengo and Settepanella (2010) introduced a model of social choice among bundles of interdependent elements. In this paper we prove that their voting model is highly decidable, i.e. a group of agents that agrees to use such voting process has an high probability to reach a final decision. We also better qualify the degree of manipulability of such a final decision, showing that it is independent not only from the agenda, but also from the initial condition. Therefore we show that the Marengo and Settepanella (2010) model has nice properties of decidability and can be fruitfully used both for normative and positive analyzes of collective choices among complex interdependent elements.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: LEM Working Paper Series ; No. 2012/12

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: social rule ; object ; optimum ; probability ; tournament

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Marengo, Luigi ; Pirino, Davide ; Settepanella, Simona ; Takemura, Akimichi
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM)
• (where): Pisa
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89288
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET