Arbeitspapier

On the optimality of a minimum wage: new insights from optimal tax theory

We build a theoretical model to study whether a minimum wage can be welfare-improving if it is implemented in conjunction with an optimized nonlinear income tax. We consider this issue in a framework where search frictions on the labor market generate unemployment. Workers differ in productivity. The government does not observe workers' productivity but only their wages. Hence, the redistributive policy solves an adverse selection problem. We show that a minimum wage is optimal if the bargaining power of the workers is relatively low. However, if the government controls the bargaining power, then it is preferable to set a sufficiently high bargaining power.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2957

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Optimale Besteuerung
Mindestlohn
Einkommensteuer
Lohnverhandlungen
Friktionelle Arbeitslosigkeit
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hungerbühler, Mathias
Lehmann, Etienne
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Hungerbühler, Mathias
  • Lehmann, Etienne
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2007

Other Objects (12)