Arbeitspapier

Judical independence and the validity of converted elections

This article examines whether the judges of the French Constitutional Court demonstrated partisanship when ruling on the validity of the elections to the lower house of the French Parliament between 1958 and 2005. It uses a new dataset on the decisions of the Constitutional Court which takes into account the characteristics of the controverted parliamentary elections. The rulings of the Constitutional Court are found to be biased against far-right candidates. However, the judges are also found to display some form of independence vis-à-vis the government since they do not favor candidates from the ruling party when they render their decisions.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2009-08

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Subject
Judicial independence
Judicial politics
Judges
Parliamentary elections
Wahl
Parlament
Rechtsprechung
Verfassungsgericht
Neue politische Ökonomie
Frankreich

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Franck, Raphaël
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
(where)
Ramat-Gan
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Franck, Raphaël
  • Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2009

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