A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care

Arbeitspapier

We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate that moral hazard is not important. Furthermore, we find strong evidence for advantageous selection, largely driven by heterogeneity in education, income and health preferences. Finally, we show that ignoring dynamics and unobserved fixed effects changes the results dramatically.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 08-084/3

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Analysis of Health Care Markets ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies ; Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models
• Subject: supplementary private health insurance ; health care utilization ; advantageous selection ; moral hazard ; panel data ; Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung ; Risikomodell ; Moral Hazard ; Adverse Selektion ; Private Krankenversicherung ; Irland

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bolhaar, Jonneke ; Lindeboom, Maarten ; van der Klaauw, Bas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86889
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET