How Pleasures Make Life Better

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that Phenomenalists about pleasure can concede a key claim, Heterogeneity, commonly used to object to their theory. They also can then vindicate the aspirations of J. S. Mill's doctrine of higher pleasures, while grounding their value claims in a naturalistic metaethics. But once Phenomenalists concede Heterogeneity they can no longer consistently endorse Hedonism as the correct theory of wellbeing, since they implicitly commit to recognizing distinct kinds of pleasure that are independently good-making. I also explore further issues that arise for a Pluralist theory of pleasure: How could there be distinct kinds of pleasure? How can pleasures be measured? Is it possible for some pleasures to be superior in kind to others? What unifies the category of pleasant experiences? Is the value of pleasant experiences natural or non-natural?

Angaben zum Objekt

• Standort: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Umfang: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: How Pleasures Make Life Better ; volume:31 ; number:1 ; year:2017 ; pages:1-23 ; extent:24 ; Kriterion ; 31, Heft 1 (2017), 1-23 (gesamt 24)

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Urheber: Alwood, Andrew H.

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: 10.1515/krt-2017-310102
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2022090315425771119973
• Rechteinformation: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 15.08.2025, 07:29 MESZ