Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools

Arbeitspapier

This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a pay- for-percentile or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 13696

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Field Experiments ; Analysis of Education ; Public Sector Labor Markets ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects ; Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
• Thema: pay-for-performance ; selection ; incentives ; teachers ; field experiment

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Leaver, Clare ; Ozier, Owen ; Serneels, Pieter ; Zeitlin, Andrew
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2020

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/227223
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ