Arbeitspapier
The Borda count with weak preferences
I consider an extension of the Borda count to the case when individuals can have weak preferences, and I show that it satisfies several normatively appealing axioms. The first axiom is an extension to the case of weak preferences of the Modified Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom inMaskin (2020a). The second axiom is a new axiom which I call Up-Down Symmetry. The remaining axioms are more standard.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 921
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
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Social choice
Borda rule
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Ivanov, Asen
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
- (where)
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London
- (when)
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2021
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ivanov, Asen
- Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
Time of origin
- 2021
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