Taxation, social protection, and governance decentralization

Arbeitspapier

Governments do not have perfect information regarding constituent priorities and needs. This lack of knowledge opens the door for groups to lobby in order to affect the government's taxation levels. We examine the political economy of decentralized revenue-raising authority in light of social protection expenditures by constructing a theoretical model of hierarchical contests and comparing the implications of centralized with decentralized governance. Increasing information available to the government may generate additional expenditures by interest groups trying to affect government taxation decisions. We show the potential existence of a poverty trap as a result of decentralization in taxation decisions.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-92-9256-145-1
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WIDER Working Paper ; No. 2016/101

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
• Subject: governance ; decentralization ; economic-models-of-political-processes ; contests ; rent-seeking ; intergovernmental-relation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Epstein, Gil S. ; Gang, Ira N.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
• (where): Helsinki
• (when): 2016

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2016/145-1
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/161485
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET