Magical thinking: A representation result

Artikel

This paper suggests a novel way to import the approach of axiomatic theories of individual choice into strategic settings and demonstrates the benefits of this approach. We propose both a tractable behavioral model as well as axioms applied to the behavior of the collection of players, focusing first on prisoners' dilemma games. A representation theorem establishes these axioms as the precise behavioral content of the model, and that the model's parameters are (essentially) uniquely identified from behavior. The behavioral model features magical thinking: players behave as if their expectations about their opponents' behavior vary with their own choices. The model provides a unified view of documented behavior in a range of often studied games, such as the prisoners' dilemma, the battle of the sexes, hawk-dove, and the stag hunt, and also generates novel predictions across games.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 909-956 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: Magical thinking ; axioms/representation theorem ; prisoners' dilemma ; coordination games

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Daley, Brendan ; Sadowski, Philipp
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The Econometric Society
• (wo): New Haven, CT
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE2099
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197207
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ