Assessing the Impact of Federalism on Constitutional Compliance

Arbeitspapier

Federalism is a constitutionalized version of multi-tier governance. Proponents of veto-player theory argue that a high number of veto players leads to a high degree of policy stability. Compared to states with a unitary structure, federal countries, in which at least one sub-central level of government is constitutionally recognized and endowed with some degree of exclusive competences, dispose of a higher number of veto players, who can voice and challenge constitutional non-compliance by the central government. In this paper, we therefore ask whether federally constituted states also enjoy a higher degree of constitutional compliance, i.e. have governments that respect and enforce the promises made in their country's constitution. At the same time, with a higher number of governments under federalism, there are more chances that some of them will not comply with constitutional constraints leading to greater non-compliance. To test these hypotheses, we employ data from up to 162 countries and apply standard panel data estimation techniques. Contrary to expectations, our results indicate that federalism is neither positively nor negatively correlated with constitutional compliance of the respective countries.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ILE Working Paper Series ; No. 79

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government ; Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law) ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies ; Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology: General ; Cultural Economics: Public Policy
• Subject: constitutional compliance ; de jure-de facto gap ; federalism

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kantorowicz, Jaroslaw ; Voigt, Stefan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE)
• (where): Hamburg
• (when): 2024

Further information

• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET