Artikel

Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information

Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with multiple rationalizable (ICR) actions, there exist similar types with unique rationalizable action. This paper studies how a wide class of departures from common belief in rationality impact Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity. We weaken ICR to ICRλ, where λ is a sequence whose term λn is the probability players attach to (n- 1)th-order belief in rationality. We find that Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity remains when λn is above an appropriate threshold for all n, but fails when λn converges to 0. That is, if players' confidence in mutual rationality persists at high orders, the discontinuity persists, but if confidence vanishes at high orders, the discontinuity vanishes.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 15 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 89-122 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
Robustness
rationalizability
bounded rationality
incomplete information
belief hierarchies

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Germano, Fabrizio
Weinstein, Jonathan
Zuazo-Garin, Peio
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2020

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE2734
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Germano, Fabrizio
  • Weinstein, Jonathan
  • Zuazo-Garin, Peio
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2020

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