Must Values Have Subjective Existence?

Abstract: In this paper, I begin by outlining two assumptions that are routinely taken for granted in ethical discourse, one of which entails that values have subjective existence. I then consider a causal account of valuational activity offered by Bruce Morito which serves to question the truth of that assumption, and the extent to which that account falls short of overturning it. Finally, in light of that short-coming, I sketch what I characterize as a “quasi-objective theory of value” the truth of which depends upon a non-regularist and non-actualist conception of laws of nature

Angaben zum Objekt

• Standort: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Umfang: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Must Values Have Subjective Existence? ; volume:1 ; number:18 ; year:2004 ; pages:25-31 ; extent:7 ; Kriterion ; 1, Heft 18 (2004), 25-31 (gesamt 7)

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Urheber: Torell, Kurt

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: 10.1515/krt-2004-011806
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2022090314523226944518
• Rechteinformation: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 15.08.2025, 07:23 MESZ