Arbeitspapier

Recruitment to organised crime

Organised crime is unique within the underground economy. Unlike individual criminals, criminal organisations can substitute between a variety of inputs; chiefly labour and effort. This paper considers the effect of several popular anti-crime policies in such an environment. Using a profit maximisation framework, I find that certain policies may cause the organisation to reduce its membership in favour of more intensive activity. Others may lead to increases in membership. Consequently, policies designed to reduce the social loss suffered as a result of criminal activities may actually increase it. Results prove robust to differences in hiring practices on the part of the criminal organisation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2013/10

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Thema
Organised crime
Crime policy
Occupational choice.

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Long, Iain W.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
(wo)
Cardiff
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Long, Iain W.
  • Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School

Entstanden

  • 2013

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