Risk Selection under Public Health Insurance with Opt-out

Konferenzbeitrag

This paper studies risk selection between public and private health insurance when some individuals can purchase private insurance by opting out of otherwise mandatory public insurance. Using a theoretical model, I show that public insurance is adversely selected when insurers and insureds are symmetrically informed about health-related risks, and that selection can be of any type (advantageous or adverse) when insureds have private information about health risks. Drawing on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, I find that: (1) public insurance is adversely selected under the German public health insurance with opt-out scheme, (2) individuals adversely select public insurance based on self-assessed health and advantageously select public insurance based on risk aversion, and (3) there is evidence of asymmetric information.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Health Economics 2 ; No. B19-V2

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Health Insurance, Public and Private ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; National Government Expenditures and Health

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Panthöfer, Sebastian
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/113085
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET