Artikel

Information in elections: Do third inflexible candidates always promote truthful behavior?

We model an election between two Downsian mainstream candidates and a third inflexible politician. There is uncertainty about the state of the world. Candidates receive signals on the state and propose a policy to implement. There are two classes of voters: ideological, who are biased towards the policy proposed by the third candidate; and non-ideological, who want the policy implemented to correspond to the state of the world. We study two cases: (1) one in which the third candidate supports the most popular policy (in terms of the electorate's prior); (2) another one in which he supports the less popular policy. We obtain that the presence of a third candidate facilitates equilibria in which the two mainstream politicians make informative announcements, specially when the third candidate is biased towards the most popular policy. We also obtain that many of the informative equilibria are sustained by a coalition government, however the coalition is never between the two mainstream candidates. Last, we observe that in equilibrium, the third inflexible candidate has significant chances of winning office.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 7 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 307-339 ; Heidelberg: Springer

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Subject
Electoral competition
Heterogeneous voters
Information transmission
Voting
Coalition governments

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Andina-Díaz, Ascensión
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Springer
(where)
Heidelberg
(when)
2016

DOI
doi:10.1007/s13209-016-0143-8
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Andina-Díaz, Ascensión
  • Springer

Time of origin

  • 2016

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