Arbeitspapier

Capacity Rights and Full Cost Transfer Pricing

This paper examines the theoretical properties of full cost transfer prices in multi-divisional firms. In our model, divisional managers are responsible for the initial acquisition of productive capacity and the utilization of that capacity in subsequent periods, once operational uncertainty has been resolved. We examine alternative variants of full cost transfer pricing with the property that the discounted sum of transfer payments is equal to the initial capacity acquisition cost and the present value of all subsequent variable costs of output supplied to a division. Our analysis identifies environments where particular variants of full cost transfer pricing induce efficiency in both the initial investments and the subsequent output levels. Our findings highlight the need for a proper integration of intracompany pricing rules and divisional control rights over capacity assets.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7968

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dutta, Sunil
Reichelstein, Stefan J.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dutta, Sunil
  • Reichelstein, Stefan J.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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