Disentangling fiscal effects of local constitutions

Arbeitspapier

We apply the difference-in-discontinuities design to disentangle the fiscal effects of the governance system conditional on electoral systems. We take advantage of a natural experiment, which involves two institutional reforms at the local level in Poland. The first reform introduced two electoral rules, which change along an exogenous population threshold: smaller municipalities use majoritarian elections, larger municipalities use proportional elections. The second reform changed the governance system in Polish municipalities from “parliamentary” to “presidential”. Our results indicate that a change from parliamentary to presidential form led to lower vertical fiscal imbalance predominantly in the jurisdictions with majoritarian elections and to a lesser extent in municipalities governed by proportional elections. This therefore confirms an interaction effect between the forms of government and electoral rules.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Agenda Austria Working Paper ; No. 06

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; State and Local Budget and Expenditures
• Subject: electoral rules ; vertical fiscal imbalance ; constitutions

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kantorowicz, Jarosław ; Köppl-Turyna, Monika
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Agenda Austria
• (where): Wien
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/163563
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET