Arbeitspapier
Sickness absence and search unemployment
The paper presents a model that allows a unified analysis of sickness absence and search unemployment. Sickness appears as random shocks to individual utility functions, interacts with individual searchand labor supply decisions and triggers movements across labor force states. The employed worker prefers absence for sufficiently severe sickness and the unemployed worker may prefer nonparticipation if the disutility of search is amplified by sickness. The decisions governing labor force transitions are influenced by social insurance benefits available for sick or unemployed workers. We examine how these benefits affect individual decisions on absence and search and the implications for employment, unemployment and nonparticipation. The normative analysis of the socially optimal benefit structure suggests that there is, in general, a case for benefit di.erentiation across states of non-work. In particular, there is a case for a benefit structure that rewards active job search.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1227
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
- Subject
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sickness absence
search
unemployment
sickness benefits
unemployment benefits
Fehlzeit
Krankheit
Arbeitsuche
Arbeitslosenversicherung
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Holmlund, Bertil
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
-
2004
- Handle
- Last update
-
20.09.2024, 8:21 AM CEST
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Holmlund, Bertil
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2004