Disability risk, disability insurance and life cycle behavior

Arbeitspapier

This paper provides a life-cycle framework for weighing up the insurance value of disability benefi ts against the incentive cost. Within this framework, we estimate the life-cycle risks that individuals face in the US, as well as the parameters governing the disability insurance program, using indirect inference and longitudinal data on consumption, disability status, disability insurance receipt, and wages. We use our estimates to characterize the effectiveness of the disability insurance program and to consider the e ffect on welfare and behaviour of policy reform. High levels of false rejections associated with the screening process imply welfare increases as the program becomes less strict, despite the worsening incentives that this implies. Incentives for false applications are reduced by reducing generosity and increasing reassessments and these improve welfare, despite the worse insurance implied.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IFS Working Papers ; No. 10,11

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡ ; National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs ; Social Security and Public Pensions ; Retirement; Retirement Policies
• Thema: Disability ; social security ; savings behavior ; wage risk ; Erwerbsunfähigkeit ; Risiko ; Unfallversicherung ; Erwerbsunfähigkeitsrente ; Lebenszyklus ; Wohlfahrtseffekt

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Low, Hamish ; Pistaferri, Luigi
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)
• (wo): London
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47502
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ