- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Identifier
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1188469134
- Reihe
-
Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008); 02-06
Thema
Wettbewerb ; Auktionstheorie ; Spieltheorie ; Asymmetrische Information
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
- URN
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
26.01.2023, 13:54 MEZ
Objekttyp
- Monografie
Beteiligte
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