Arbeitspapier

The mechanics of central bank intervention in foreign exchange markets

Central banks in developing countries, wanting to devalue the domestic currency, usually intervene in the foreign exchange market by buying up foreign currency using domestic money-often backing this up with sterilization to counter inflationary pressures. Such interventions are usually effective in devaluing the currency but lead to a build up of foreign exchange reserves beyond what the central bank may need. The present paper analyzes the mechanics of such central bank interventions and, using techniques of industrial organization theory, proposes new kinds of interventions which have the same desired effect on the exchange rate, without causing a build up of reserves.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CAE Working Paper ; No. 09-02

Classification
Wirtschaft
Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Foreign Exchange
Financial Institutions and Services: General
Subject
exchange rate
oligopoly theory
central bank intervention
foreign exchange dealers
India
Wechselkurspolitik
Währungsreserven
Devisenmarkt
Oligopol
Indien
Entwicklungsländer

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Basu, Kaushik
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Cornell University, Center for Analytical Economics (CAE)
(where)
Ithaca, NY
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Basu, Kaushik
  • Cornell University, Center for Analytical Economics (CAE)

Time of origin

  • 2009

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