Arbeitspapier
Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions
In the context of a stylised game theoretical framework of capital tax competition, we show that when repeated policy interactions are associated to a systematic punishment of the deviating policymaker, a co-ordinated outcome can be the solution to the non co-operative tax game. This result suggests that explicit forms of policy co-ordination, such as a centralised tax authority, could in fact be largely unnecessary.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 259
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
- Subject
-
International Fiscal Issues
Policy Co-ordination
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Catenaro, Marco
Vidal, Jean-Pierre
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
European Central Bank (ECB)
- (where)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (when)
-
2003
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Catenaro, Marco
- Vidal, Jean-Pierre
- European Central Bank (ECB)
Time of origin
- 2003
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The Co-Ordination of Colonial Studies.
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