- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
-
1 Online-Ressource.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Gamson–Shapley Laws: a formal approach to parliamentary coalition formation ; volume:10 ; number:1 ; day:16 ; month:10 ; year:2023 ; pages:1-10 ; date:12.2023
Humanities and Social Sciences Communications ; 10, Heft 1 (16.10.2023), 1-10, 12.2023
- Classification
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Politik
- Creator
- Contributor
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SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
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10.1057/s41599-023-02207-7
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2024020512484085960691
- Rights
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
15.08.2025, 7:37 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Demyanenko, Nataliya
- La Mura, Pierfrancesco
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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