Media see-saws: Winners and losers on media platforms

Arbeitspapier

We customize the aggregative game approach to oligopoly to study asymmetric media markets. Advertiser, platform, and consumer surplus are tied together by a simple summary statistic. When media are ad-financed and ads are a nuisance to consumers we establish see-saws between consumers and advertisers. Entry of a lower-quality platform increases consumer surplus, but decreases advertiser surplus if industry platform profits decrease with entry. Merger decreases consumer surplus, but advertiser surplus increases when the profits of the higher-quality platform within the merger increase. By contrast, when platforms use two-sided pricing or consumers like advertising,advertiser and consumer interests are often aligned.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper Series ; No. 15-16

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Subject: media economics ; mergers ; entry ; advertising ; aggregative games

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Anderson, Simon P. ; Peitz, Martin
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
• (where): Mannheim
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129598
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-397506
• Last update: 09.04.2025, 10:35 PM CEST