Arbeitspapier
Social Insurance and Redistribution
This paper studies optimal linear income taxation and redistributive social insurance when the former has the traditional labor distortion and the latter generates both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. Private insurance is available and individuals differ in labor productivity and in loss probability. We show that government intervention in insurance markets is welfare-improving, and social insurance is generally desirable when there is a negative correlation between labor productivity and loss probability.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1004
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
National Government Expenditures and Health
- Thema
-
Social Insurance
Moral Hazard
Redistribution
Einkommensteuer
Sozialversicherung
Umverteilung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Boadway, Robin
Leite-Monteiro, Manuel
Marchand, Maurice
Pestieau, Pierre
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Queen's University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Kingston (Ontario)
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Boadway, Robin
- Leite-Monteiro, Manuel
- Marchand, Maurice
- Pestieau, Pierre
- Queen's University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2002