Arbeitspapier

Social Insurance and Redistribution

This paper studies optimal linear income taxation and redistributive social insurance when the former has the traditional labor distortion and the latter generates both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. Private insurance is available and individuals differ in labor productivity and in loss probability. We show that government intervention in insurance markets is welfare-improving, and social insurance is generally desirable when there is a negative correlation between labor productivity and loss probability.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1004

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
National Government Expenditures and Health
Thema
Social Insurance
Moral Hazard
Redistribution
Einkommensteuer
Sozialversicherung
Umverteilung
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Boadway, Robin
Leite-Monteiro, Manuel
Marchand, Maurice
Pestieau, Pierre
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Kingston (Ontario)
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Boadway, Robin
  • Leite-Monteiro, Manuel
  • Marchand, Maurice
  • Pestieau, Pierre
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2002

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