Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes: An experiment

Arbeitspapier

The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. But despite uniform money payoffs implying common interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes, and of gender and intelligence.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2010-1

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Public Goods
• Subject: public good ; voluntary contribution ; formal sanction ; experiment ; penalty ; voting ; Öffentliches Gut ; Public Choice ; Strafe ; Wahlverhalten ; Spieltheorie ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Putterman, Louis ; Tyran, Jean-Robert ; Kamei, Kenju
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Brown University, Department of Economics
• (where): Providence, RI
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62651
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET