Arbeitspapier

Better winding up: A proposal for improved winding up of executory contracts

An evaluation problem exists when winding up executory contracts in case of insolvency. The trustee has difficulties in accurately considering the claim for damages that arises if he chooses to reject a contract instead of accepting it. An unequal treatment of creditors and inefficiencies follow. However, a simple reform can solve this problem. If an executory contract is accepted by the trustee, there should be the same claim for damages as if it had been rejected. Only the difference between this claim for damages and the initial claim should be paid directly out of the estate.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Diskussionspapier des Instituts für Organisationsökonomik ; No. 4/2015

Classification
Management
Bankruptcy; Liquidation
Other Substantive Areas of Law: Other
Personal Bankruptcy Law
Business and Securities Law

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Dilger, Alexander
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Institut für Organisationsökonomik
(where)
Münster
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Dilger, Alexander
  • Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Institut für Organisationsökonomik

Time of origin

  • 2015

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