Arbeitspapier

A Dynamic Game with Interaction between Kantian Players and Nashian Players

This paper defines the concept of feedback Kant-Nash equilibrium for a discrete-time model of resource exploitation by infinitely-lived Kantian and Nashian players, where we define Kantian agents as those who act in accordance with the categorical imperative. We revisit a well-known dynamic model of the tragedy of the commons and ask what would happen if not all agents are solely motivated by self interest. We establish that even without external punishment of violation of social norms, if a sufficiently large fraction of the population consists of Kantian agents, the tragedy of the commons can be substantially mitigated.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7729

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Externalities
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Thema
Kantian equilibrium
rule of behavior
categorical imperative

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Long, Ngo Van
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Long, Ngo Van
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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