Multilateral intermediation of foreign aid: What is the trade-off for donor countries?

Arbeitspapier

Why would bilateral donors intermediate aid through a multilateral and not extend aid directly? This paper suggests a trade-off: multiple bilateral donors for each recipient may imply coordination and strategic problems but intermediating through a multilateral may dilute individual donor objectives. The paper conducts traditional panel and truly bilateral regressions with bilateral-pair, fixed effects to model aid allocation decisions. The results confirm that politics is important for bilateral donors but also that aid fragmentation and strategic behavior affect aid allocation. Multilaterals solve strategic and coordination problems between donors and, while politics remains significant, there is some evidence for a dilution of this effect.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 594

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; International Lending and Debt Problems ; Foreign Aid ; International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
• Thema: Aid ; Capital Flows ; Multilaterals ; Panel ; Entwicklungshilfe ; Bilaterale Entwicklungshilfe ; Entwicklungskooperation ; Entwicklungsstrategie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Powell, Andrew ; Bobba, Matteo
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department
• (wo): Washington, DC
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51470
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ