Performance measure congruity in linear agency models with interactive tasks

Arbeitspapier

This note demonstrates how performance measure congruity and noise determine an agency's total surplus within an linear agency framework with multiple tasks. It provides a decomposition of agency costs, leading back to a congruity index previously proposed in the literature. In addition, it generalizes this index to a more general cost function, thereby highlighting the context specificity of the original criterion. Finally, it suggests a redefinition of tasks under which the criterion prevails.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 204

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
• Subject: incentives ; multi-tasking ; performance measurement

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Budde, Jörg
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (where): München
• (when): 2006

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13348
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93913
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13348-2
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET