Arbeitspapier
Accident Law: An Excessive Standard May Be Efficient
In a world with risk-neutral agents, liability rules will only induce efficient behaviour if these rules impose the full (marginal) costs of an action on the parties. However, institutional restrictions or bilateral activity choices can prevent the full internalisation of costs. A mechanism is proposed which guarantees an efficient outcome: monetary fines which are not related to the occurrence of an accident. Such a mechanism requires individuals to violate the standard of care in order to trigger fine payments. Hence, efficiency needs an excessive standard.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 625
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
accident law
activity
care
efficiency
fines
standards of care
tort law
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Goerke, Laszlo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Goerke, Laszlo
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2001
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