Quantities vs. capacities: Minimizing the social cost of renewable energy promotion

Arbeitspapier

In this article we show how different promotion schemes for renewables affect economic welfare. Our starting point is that external benefits of renewable electricity supply besides the abatement of greenhouse gases are not related to actual electricity generation but to producing and installing capacity. We argue that generation based subsidies such as feed-in tariffs and bonus payments can only be a second-best solution. Our model framework allows us to explain how these second-best instruments cause welfare losses in an environment of volatile demand. We postulate that capacity payments for renewables should be implemented in order to avoid unnecessary social costs.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CAWM Discussion Paper ; No. 59

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Energy: Demand and Supply; Prices ; Energy: Government Policy ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
• Thema: Renewable Energy Sources ; Energy Policy ; Promotion Instruments

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Andor, Mark ; Flinkerbusch, Kai ; Voß, Achim
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Centrum für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (CAWM)
• (wo): Münster
• (wann): 2012

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62131
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ