Arbeitspapier
The Firm as a Competent Team
Results from empirical studies of firm behavior are synthesized into, a theory of the firm as a competent team. I demonstrate the existence of a tacit organizational competence exercising a leverage on the productivities of all other factors through selecting and allocating competent people, thus earning a monopoly rent in the capital market. The competence identified can only be fairly compensated through sharing in firm value growth in the equity market, exhibiting undervaluation of prime assets. Policies aimed at firm efficiency should improve the market measurement function, including stimulating insiders to exhibit information through trades.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 207
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
Organization of Production
- Thema
-
Human capital
firm structure
factor compensation
efficiency
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Eliasson, Gunnar
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
1988
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Eliasson, Gunnar
- The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
Entstanden
- 1988
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Team incentives: Evidence from a firm level experiment
Individual Compensation and Firm Performance: The Economics of Team Incentives
The political party as a firm
Modelling firm mergers as a roommate problem
Team Reasoning as a Guide to Coordination
Incentives and managerial experience in multi-task teams: Evidence from within a firm
The firm as a pool of factor complementarities
The firm as a pool of factor complementarities
The firm as a pool of factor complementarities
The firm as a pool of factor complementarities
The firm as a pool of factor complementarities
Incentivizing Team Leaders: A Firm-Level Experiment on Subjective Performance Evaluation of Leadership Skills
Team incentives: Evidence from a firm level experiment
Individual Compensation and Firm Performance: The Economics of Team Incentives
The political party as a firm
Modelling firm mergers as a roommate problem
Team Reasoning as a Guide to Coordination
Incentives and managerial experience in multi-task teams: Evidence from within a firm
The firm as a pool of factor complementarities
The firm as a pool of factor complementarities
The firm as a pool of factor complementarities
The firm as a pool of factor complementarities
The firm as a pool of factor complementarities
Incentivizing Team Leaders: A Firm-Level Experiment on Subjective Performance Evaluation of Leadership Skills
Team incentives: Evidence from a firm level experiment
Individual Compensation and Firm Performance: The Economics of Team Incentives
The political party as a firm
Modelling firm mergers as a roommate problem
Team Reasoning as a Guide to Coordination
Incentives and managerial experience in multi-task teams: Evidence from within a firm
The firm as a pool of factor complementarities
The firm as a pool of factor complementarities
The firm as a pool of factor complementarities
The firm as a pool of factor complementarities
The firm as a pool of factor complementarities