Arbeitspapier

The Political Economy of Privatization. Why Do Governments Want Reforms?

International organizations promote privatization as precondition for economic development. But is there really too little privatization? This political economy model asks for the incentives of governments to privatize or restructure a state-owned firm. Different government types are compared to identify the political and institutional determinants of privatization. Under privatization, governments commit not to influence the profit-maximizing employment choice by private investors. With respect to the social optimum, both voter-oriented and egoistic governments can have inefficiently high incentives to privatize. When this is the case, outside pressure to privatize is detrimental. An improving institutional environment reduces these inefficiencies.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2004-1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Governmental Property
Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
Subject
political incentives
privatization
restructuring
employment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Börner, Kira
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
(where)
München
(when)
2004

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.296
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-296-1
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Börner, Kira
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät

Time of origin

  • 2004

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