Artikel

Do better political institutions help in reducing political pressure on state-owned banks? Evidence from developing countries

This study examines whether state-owned banks face political pressure and whether the improvement in political institutions alleviates this pressure. The theory of political benefits argues that politicians use state-owned banks for political purposes such as obtaining and maintaining political support. We reviewed extant empirical research and found that the existing evidence is mixed; some studies support while others reject the theory. In this backdrop, we analyzed a sample of 185 state-owned banks from 51 developing countries over the period 1998-2012 and provide renewed evidence supporting the theory. Specifically, we found that state-owned banks face significant political pressure in developing countries; that is, they lend more and earn less in election years. Next, we observed that the political pressure is prevalent only in the countries with weak political institutions. Strong political institutions in the form of higher constraints on policy change decisions of incumbent government and higher democratic accountability are helpful in eliminating political pressure on state-owned banks in developing countries.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Journal of Risk and Financial Management ; ISSN: 1911-8074 ; Volume: 11 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1-10 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
Thema
political institutions
state-owned banks
elections
political pressure
bank lending
bank profitability

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ashraf, Badar Nadeem
Arshad, Sidra
Yan, Liang
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2018

DOI
doi:10.3390/jrfm11030043
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Ashraf, Badar Nadeem
  • Arshad, Sidra
  • Yan, Liang
  • MDPI

Entstanden

  • 2018

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