Relative payoffs and evolutionary spite: Evolutionary equilibria in games with finitely many players

Arbeitspapier

Evolutionary dynamics in games imply de-facto spiteful behavior of the players: In order to 'survive' the evolutionary process, players must perform better than their opponents. This means they maximize relative rather than absolute payoffs. The paper shows that there is a class of games resulting in different equilibria if played by maximizers of absolute or of relative pay-offs, respectively. It is demonstrated that evolutionary equilibria (general ESS) can be found by formally maximizing relative payoffs. This method is analytically deduced and demonstrated at the examples of four well known games: the Cournot oligopoly game, the public goods game, the Tullock game of rent seeking and the Van Huyck et al. (1990) coordination game.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Diskussionsbeitrag ; No. 260

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
• Thema: Evolutionary Games ; Evolutionary Equilibrium ; Spiteful Behavior ; Relative Payoff ; Rationales Verhalten ; Gleichgewichtsstabilität ; Theorie ; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Riechmann, Thomas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
• (wo): Hannover
• (wann): 2002

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78362
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ