Tying lending and underwriting : scope economies, incentives, and reputation [[Elektronische Ressource]]
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Ausgabe
-
Version October 2006
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2006,27
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Schlagwort
-
Tying
Investment Banking
Universal Banking
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt am Main
- (wer)
-
Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- (wann)
-
2006
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-38017
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:50 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Laux, Christian
- Walz, Uwe
- Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Entstanden
- 2006
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