Arbeitspapier

Spatial competition with capacity constraints and subcontracting

We characterize mixed-strategy equilibria when capacity constrained suppliers can charge location-based prices to different customers. We establish an equilibrium with prices that weakly increase in the costs to supply a customer. Despite prices above costs and excess capacities, each supplier exclusively serves its home market in equilibrium. Competition yields volatile market shares and an inefficient allocation of customers to firms. Even ex-post cross-supplies may restore efficiency only partly. We use our findings to discuss recent competition policy cases and provide hints for a more refined coordinated-effects analysis.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1813

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Metals and Metal Products; Cement; Glass; Ceramics
Thema
Bertrand-Edgeworth
capacity constraints
inefficient competition
spatial price discrimination
subcontracting
transport costs

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hunold, Matthias
Muthers, Johannes
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics
(wo)
Linz
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hunold, Matthias
  • Muthers, Johannes
  • Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2018

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