Harassment, Corruption and Economic Policy

Arbeitspapier

This paper introduces harassment in a model of bribery and corruption. We characterize the harassment equilibrium and show that taxpayers with all possible levels of income participate in such an equilibrium. Harassment has a regressive bias. Harassment cost as such may not affect tax revenue. However, when the decision to file tax-returns is endogenized, harassment cost can affect the filing pattern and hence the revenue collection. We study the nature of the equilibrium under imperfect information when different types of taxpayers and different types of auditors are introduced in the system.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 189

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Corruption ; Harassment ; Filing

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Marjit, Sugata ; Mukherjee, Vivekananda ; Mukherjee, Arijit
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 1999

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75687
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET